The perils of semi-presidentialism. Are they exaggerated? Most academic observers agree that, like presidentialism, semi-presidentialism is a problematic regime type for newly-democratising countries and that parliamentarism should be preferred ahead of it. For example, in the early 1990s Linz stated that: "In view of some of the experiences with [semi-presidentialism] it seems dubious to argue that in and by itself it can generate democratic stability". 1 More than a decade later many writers echo Linz's judgment. For example, Lijphart has recently written that semi-presidential systems "represent only a slight improvement over pure presidentialism" 2 and states that "parliamentary government should be the general guideline for constitution writers in divided societies". 3 For his part, Valenzuela has argued that semipresidentialism "may not solve some of the inherent problems of presidentialism, and indeed could make them worse by reifying the conflict between two state powers and personalizing them in the figure of the president and the prime minister". 4 If these observers are correct, then democratizing countries would do well to avoid semi-presidentialism. Paradoxically, though, to date there has been no systematic cross-national study of the performance of semi-presidentialism. Instead, studies have tended to focus on semipresidentialism in particular regions. 5 This article aims to fill that gap. We do not aim to compare the performance of semi-presidentialism relative to presidentialism and parliamentarism. Instead, we seek to examine whether there is empirical evidence to support the specific arguments that are made against semi-presidentialism. In this sense, we aim to establish whether semipresidentialism is as perilous as the scholarly consensus would suggest.
We begin with a definition of semi-presidentialism and identify a list of semi-presidential regimes. We then briefly outline the three main objections to semi-presidentialism. They are that, like presidentialism, the direct election of the president encourages populist candidates who, if elected, often consider themselves to be above the law; that semi-presidentialism can lead to destabilizing periods of 'cohabitation' between the president and the prime minister -this is the most well-known argument against semi-presidentialism;
and, finally, that semi-presidentialism is particularly vulnerable to collapse during periods of 'divided minority government' as presidents are encouraged to rule by decree -this is a more recent claim. Given they are specific to semipresidentialism, we focus on the last two objections. We find that: first, there have been only three examples of cohabitation in partial democracies and only one case where it has directly led to the collapse of the democratization process;
second, in full democracies cohabitation has never been associated with breakdown, even in the very early years of such democracies; third, relative to cohabitation, there are more examples of divided minority government and more cases where it has been associated with democratic failure in partial democracies;
fourth, while there is an equal number of cases where divided minority government has not led to breakdown of such democracies, these cases have been associated with a dangerous personalization of the political process; fifth, in full democracies divided minority government has never led to democratic breakdown, or even a decline in status from a full democracy to a partial democracy. The article concludes by arguing that the most well established argument against semi-presidentialism remains largely unfounded. Instead, attention should focus on the more recent argument that semi-presidentialism is vulnerable during periods of divided minority government, particularly in systems which the presidency has been a strong political actor from the start.
What is semi-presidentialism and where is it found?
The original definition of semi-presidentialism was provided by Duverger Shugart recently identified 26 semi-presidential countries and implied that the list was not exhaustive. 8 To the extent that the list of semi-presidential countries varies from one writer to the next, often like is not being compared with like. For example, if a writer includes only semi-presidential countries where the president and prime minister have equal powers and, hence, the inherent likelihood of intra-executive conflict is high, then we should not be surprised when the conclusion is drawn that semi-presidentialism is associated with intraexecutive conflict and should be avoided. By contrast, if a writer includes semipresidential countries where the president has fewer powers and the prime minister is the dominant actor and, therefore, the likelihood of intra-executive conflict is much lower, then we would, by definition, expect the association between semi-presidentialism and intra-executive conflict also to be much lower and the judgment about the regime type to be more positive. In other words, the study of semi-presidentialism has often suffered from a problem of selection bias.
In this context, we follow recent scholarship and propose a definition of semi-presidentialism that minimises the opportunity for variation in case selection from one writer to the next. 9 We propose a definition based on a literal reading of the constitution rather than a subjective judgment about the powers of political actors. We define semi-presidentialism as:
A regime where there is both a popularly-elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet responsible to the legislature. Figure 1) . Clearly, some of these countries are unequivocally undemocratic and semi-presidentialism has always been a purely nominal affair. But what about semi-presidentialism in countries that have embarked on a process of democratisation? To what extent has semipresidentialism affected their progress? As we shall see in the next section, the scholarly consensus is that in these cases semi-presidentialism should have been an impediment to democratisation and for some quite explicit reasons.
The consensus against semi-presidentialism
In comparison with the work on presidentialism and parliamentarism, there is much less scholarship on semi-presidentialism. 10 That said, there is a general consensus within this scholarship that semi-presidentialism is essentially problematic and that young democracies should avoid choosing it. 11 The opponents of semi-presidentialism identify three weakeness with this type of regime.
The first problem with semi-presidentialism is the same as one of the standard criticisms of presidentialism and concerns the impact of directly electing the president. 12 The direct election of the head of state encourages the president to place himself/herself above politics. Presidents claim that they have a mandate from the people -no matter how close their winning margin may have been. This mandate, they believe, gives them the authority to act in the best interests of the country, as they see it. This can lead presidents to ignore the rule of law. In addition, a closely related argument suggests that direct election encourages political outsiders to seek election. If successful, such presidents tend to ignore political parties and personalise the presidential process. The survival of the regime becomes associated with the survival of the president in office.
Opposition to the president becomes associated with opposition to the regime itself.
In the work on semi-presidentialsm, the perils of the direct election of the president have been noted. For example, when the president is supported by a loyal parliamentary majority Lijphart argues that mixed systems "actually make it possible for the president to be even more powerful that in most pure presidential systems". 13 For his part, Linz states that "as much or more than a pure presidential system, a dual executive system depends on the personality and abilities of the president". 14 Thus, semi-presidential systems may suffer from the same problem of a highly personalised political process as presidential systems. We will return to this issue in the conclusion. For the rest of this article though, we will focus on two other perils of semi-presidentalism because these objections are unique to this regime type.
The second problem with semi-presidentialism is the potential for conflict between the president and prime minister, especially during periods of 'cohabitation', or the situation where the president is from one party or political grouping and the prime minister is from an opposed party or grouping. This is what Pierce identified as the executive "divided against itself".
15
Under cohabitation, both the president and prime minister can legitimately claim that they have the authority to speak on behalf of the people.
Therefore, neither actor can trump the authority of the other. In this context, the fact that the prime minister is responsible to the legislature means that the president has either to accept the will of the legislature and coexist with a political opponent or, if the constitution allows, to defy the legislature and dismiss the head of government in the knowledge the legislature may simply appoint as prime minister someone who is equally opposed to the president. The prospect of ongoing intra-executive conflict or a prime ministerial merry-goround until the next presidential or legislative election, and perhaps beyond, is a scenario that young democracies can well do without. It may lead to a gridlock situation in which neither the president nor the prime minister is willing to compromise and where the military intervenes in order to restore effective leadership authority. Alternatively, it may lead to one or other of the executive actors, usually the president, seizing power themselves so as to resolve the impasse.
For Linz the result of cohabitation "inevitably is a lot of politicking and intrigues that may delay decision making and lead to contradictory policies due to the struggle between the president and prime minister". 16 Linz and Stepan are explicit about the dangers of cohabitation for young democracies:
When supporters of one or the other component of semipresidentialism feel that the country would be better off if one branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and suffers an overall loss of legitimacy, since those questioning one or the other will tend to consider the political system undesirable as long as the side they favor does not prevail. 17 For their part, Stepan and Suleiman recommend against countries importing semi-presidentialism. They argue that semi-presidentialism "is a more risk-prone system than the modern parliamentarism that has evolved in Europe other than France after World War II". 18 The third problem with semi-presidentialism is the potential for divided minority government. This is a more recent criticism and is associated with the work of Cindy Skach. She calls this situation "semi-presidentialism's most conflict-prone subtype". 19 She defines it as the case where "neither the president nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature". 20 This, she says, "can predictably lead to an unstable scenario, characterized by shifting legislative coalitions and government reshuffles, on the one hand, and continuous presidential intervention and use of reserved powers, on the other". 21 Furthermore, this scenario can lead to a vicious circle: "The greater the legislative immobilism, governmental instability, and cabinet reshuffling resulting from the minority position of the government, the more justified or pressured the president may feel to use their powers beyond their constitutional limit, for a prolonged period of time". 22 For Skach, the prescription is very simple. In countries where party systems are not institutionalised, which would include most nascent democracies, "the argument for borrowing semipresidentialism has profound problems". Indeed, she goes further and encourages countries that have already adopted semi-presidentialism to consider changing to parliamentarism: "It is time for Russia, along with many other fragile democracies that suffer from the semi-presidential predicament, to rethink its constitutional framework". 23 The literature on semi-presidentialism is unequivocal. This is a regime type that should be avoided. In this article, we focus on the two criticisms of semi-presidentialism that are unique to this regime type. Each criticism provides a very explicit hypothesis. Firstly, in young semi-presidential democracies cohabitation is likely to be associated with the collapse of democracy. Secondly, young semi-presidential democracies that experience divided minority government are likely to be prone to collapse. Somewhat surprisingly, to date, neither of these hypotheses has been systematically tested. There is anecdotal evidence of the perils of cohabitation, but no full-scale study of the impact of cohabitation has been undertaken. As for divided minority government, Skach has investigated the cases of France 24 and Weimar Germany in detail and she has also linked the problems of democracy in contemporary Russia with the experience of divided minority government. Again, though, no systematic comparative study has been undertaken. In the next section, we examine the record of cohabitation and divided minority government under semipresidentialism.
The impact of cohabitation and divided minority government: the method
To test the impact of cohabitation and divided minority government, we first need to identify the set of countries that have operated under a semi-presidential system during the time when they have been engaged in a process of democratisation. If the existing literature is correct, then we would expect democracy in these countries to collapse if they experienced cohabitation and/or divided minority government. Various measures of democratization have been proposed. In this study, we rely on the classifications in the Polity IV dataset.
This dataset provides codings of countries as more or less democratic from the early 19 th century up to and including 2004. The Polity scale ranges from -10 (complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). There are various points in the scale over and above which the democratization process might realistically be considered to have begun. In this study, we assume that the process of democratization has begun in the year when a country moves from a score of 0 or below to a score of +1 or more, or when a newly independent country scores +1 or more in the first year of its existence. 25 Thus, evidence of democratic failure would be where a country that previously scored +1 or more is then given a score of 0 or lower. In addition, within the range of +1 to +10 we consider countries that score from +1 to +7 inclusive to be partial democracies and countries that score +8 or above to be full democracies. 26 We expect partial democracies to be more susceptible to the problems of cohabitation and divided minority government than full democracies.
In a previous section, we identified 54 countries whose constitutions are currently semi-presidential. Some of these countries have never registered a score of +1 or more in the Polity database. We exclude all such countries, including Cameroon, Chad, Rwanda and Tajikistan among others, from the study. By contrast, we include some countries more than once. For example, Armenia scored +1 or more from 1991-95 inclusive. It then scored below +1 in 1996 and 1997, only to register a score of +1 or more again from 1998-2004. In this case, we include two entries for Armenia, one of which corresponds to a process that failed (1991-95) and a second that did not (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , the date at which the data set ends). We also include a small number of countries that were semipresidential for a period, but subsequently abandoned this form of government in favour of another. Thus, we include Moldova, which was semi-presidential from 1991-2000 until a switch to parliamentarism and which scored +1 or more during this period. We also include the Comoros and Congo-Brazzaville, both of which were semi-presidential for much of the 1990s before they switched to a presidential system of government. We also include Cuba, which was semi- Figure 2 ). In the next section, we report the findings of the study.
The impact of cohabitation and divided minority government: the findings
In countries that have scored +1 or more on the Polity scale while operating under a semi-presidential system, democracy has collapsed in 17 of the 42 cases (or 40 per cent). 29 However, this figure may underestimate the perils of semipresidentialism. In six of the 42 cases a score below 8 on the Polity scale was never registered while they have been semi-presidential. 30 Thus, they have always been classed as full democracies when operating under this type of system. If we assume that full democracies are much less likely to collapse and exclude them from the calculations, then we are left with 36 cases where semipresidentialism has operated in a country when it has been classed as a partial democracy. 31 Democracy has collapsed in 17 of these 36 cases (or 47 per cent). We are not in a position to know how this figure compares with the equivalent figures for presidential and parliamentary regimes. Our aim is not to determine the relative merits of semi-presidentialism. Instead, here, we are solely interested in whether cohabitation and divided minority government have been associated with these examples of democratic failure.
Cohabitation
As regards cohabitation, the first point to note is that it has occurred in partial democracies only very rarely. Indeed, only three countries have experienced cohabitation when they have been in the range +1 to +7 inclusive. These are
Niger (1995), Weimar Germany (1923-24 and 1927) and Sri Lanka (2002-2003).
However, in two of these countries democracy collapsed. Therefore, even though cohabitation is very rare, when it does occur it would seem to be just about as perilous as the literature would suggest. That said, when we look more closely, the situation is not quite so clear-cut.
There is no doubt that in Niger cohabitation was directly responsible for the collapse of democracy. Here, in 1995 the incumbent president, Mahmane
Ousmane, dissolved parliament prematurely. However, the subsequent election returned a majority opposed to him. When the new majority rejected the president's choice of prime minister and elected the president's opponent, Hama
Amadou, there was an ongoing stand-off between the two parts of the executive.
As one analyst put it: "both president and prime minister went 'on strike', refusing to carry out duties prescribed by the constitution for the normal functioning of the government, a near-total breakdown in constitutional procedures resulted". 32 For another observer, the "stand off between the president and the prime minister seriously discredited the democratic government and opened an opportunity for an authoritarian reversal". 33 In January 1996, the military stepped in and Niger's first experiment with democracy came to an end. This is a textbook example of the perils of cohabitation under semi-presidentialism. While many other factors are no doubt associated with the collapse of democracy in Niger, including the country's extreme poverty and lack of a democratic tradition, the experience of cohabitation was undeniably destabilising and certainly helped to bring about the military coup in 1996.
At first glance, the situation in Weimar Germany would seem to confirm the Nigerien experience. However, this situation needs more exploration. In Weimar Germany, there were four periods of cohabitation. 34 The first was from particularly, Sri Lanka. In the latter case, the predictions of rivalry between the president and prime minister were certainly correct, but democracy survived. In other words, even partial democracies may well be robust enough to cope with intra-executive tensions.
In full democracies (those that score +8 or more on the Polity scale), the situation is very clear. Here, cohabitation has occurred much more frequently and, when it has occurred, it has never been associated even indirectly with the either the collapse of democracy or a decline in the Polity score to below +8 (i.e., a decline from a full democracy to a partial democracy). Indeed, there are a number of key examples showing that even very young full democracies can survive periods of cohabitation. For example, Macedonia, and Mongolia experienced cohabitation just a year after they were first classed as full democracies. Poland and Bulgaria experienced cohabitation three years after they were first classed as full democracies. 38 In short, full democracies have always coped perfectly well with cohabitation. Arguably, this is true even when it has occurred at a time when a decline in the status of democracy was entirely possible.
In this regard, the example of Mongolia is worth exploring a little more Overall, partial democracies with a semi-presidential form of government have collapsed 17 times. Only one collapse is directly associated with cohabitation. That said, cohabitation has been an extremely rare phenomenon in partial democracies. Thus, the best we can say in support of the standard wisdom is that there is some evidence to back up the argument about the perils of cohabitation, but the jury is still out until we have the evidence from more cases. By contrast, if we weaken our assumptions somewhat and allow for the possibility that the status of full democracies is not necessarily guaranteed at least in the first few years of their existence, then we can say that cohabitation is scarcely perilous at all. In this case, the evidence suggests that the standard wisdom exaggerates the problems caused by cohabitation under semipresidentialism.
Divided minority government
In contrast to cohabitation the record of divided minority government is unequivocally worse. We find that divided minority government was clearly associated with the breakdown of democracy in five of the 17 cases in our Romania experienced divided minority government after just one year of being classed as a full democracy. Equally, Senegal also experienced a period of divided minority government just a year after being classed as a full democracy.
Thus, even if divided minority government is semi-presidentialism's most conflict-prone sub-type, it has had little impact on full democracies even in cases where party systems are still fragmented in new democracies.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to establish whether the main arguments made against semi-presidentialism stand up to empirical scrutiny. There is one very clear finding in this regard: there is insufficient evidence to make the claim that cohabitation is perilous under semi-presidentialism. Perhaps the most striking result from the empirics is that Niger is the only country where cohabitation has ever been directly responsible for the collapse of democracy. It is plausible to argue that cohabitation contributed to the collapse of democracy in Weimar
Germany, but other factors, including divided minority government, were much more influential. So, Niger is the only example that can yet be cited by the opponents of semi-presidentialism in support of their claims about the perils of cohabitation. In a sense, we should not be surprised about this finding. In the literature on democratization from the early 1990s when the standard argument was made, the perils of cohabitation were discussed almost exclusively in the context of the then still recent French experience from 1986-88 and the Polish experience in the early 1990s. Writers such as Linz and Stepan found, quite rightly, that the experience of cohabitation in these countries was politically controversial and traumatic. From these examples, they inferred that if cohabitation were to occur in a nascent democracy, then it would be dangerous for the process of democratization. In short, the standard wisdom about the negative effects of cohabitation was never based on empirical observation. We have shown that the standard wisdom has yet to be proven empirically. The
Niger example proves that the predictions of writers such as Linz and Stepan were right. However, the Sri Lanka case and, arguably, the Weimar case also prove that they were not always right. Moreover, we have shown that full democracies have managed to survive cohabitation without any change in their status, even if it has occurred in the very early years of the democratisation process. Overall, while it may be true to say that cohabitation is inefficient and undesirable, we cannot say that it is dangerous for democracy just yet. We need more examples before we can draw any such conclusion.
The situation with regard to the perils of divided minority government is slightly different. There are more cases of divided minority government than cohabitation and more cases where divided minority government has been associated more or less directly with the breakdown of democracy. Thus, Skach is right to have drawn our attention to divided minority government as the most conflict-prone sub-type of semi-presidentialism. All the same, we have also shown that divided minority government is not necessarily fatal for partial democracies and that full democracies, with the possible exception of the Austrian First Republic, have always managed to survive divided minority government even if it has occurred in the earliest years of the transition process.
In her work, Skach has argued that the perils of divided minority government are associated with the fragmentation of nascent party systems. The lack of cohesive majorities is said to encourage presidents to rule by decree, thus endangering the prospects of democratic survival. We have shown that partial democracies and fledgling full democracies have survived divided minority government even when the party system has been fragmented. So, by itself, variations in party politics do not seem to explain why divided minority government causes some democracies to collapse but not others. As a way forward, we suggest that it might be useful to explore the interaction of semipresidential regimes in which the president is a strong political actor and divided minority government. It may be the case that divided minority government does not cause presidents to become more powerful so threatening democracy. It may be that divided minority government is dangerous in cases where presidents are already powerful. This hypothesis is one that might usefully be tested in future work on the topic. 
